﻿{"id":31248,"date":"2024-11-29T12:29:43","date_gmt":"2024-11-29T19:29:43","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/runnymedesociety.ca\/?post_type=library&#038;p=31248"},"modified":"2024-11-29T12:29:43","modified_gmt":"2024-11-29T19:29:43","slug":"henry-viii-clauses-and-the-constitution-stephen-armstrong","status":"publish","type":"library","link":"https:\/\/runnymedesociety.ca\/en\/library\/henry-viii-clauses-and-the-constitution-stephen-armstrong\/","title":{"rendered":"Henry VIII Clauses and the Constitution Stephen Armstrong"},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867 reveal a formula for a governmental structure designed to protect individual liberty. These sections assign the authority to \u201cmake Laws\u201d exclusively to legislatures. The separation of legislative power from executive power and the vestiture of legislative power in a representative institution comprised of distinct societal elements serve as a structural limitation on the capacity of the state to violate individual rights. Henry VIII clauses are disruptive of the structural limitation in sections 91 and 92 because they authorize the executive to wield primary legislative powers. The thesis of this paper is that Henry VIII clauses are unconstitutional. The thesis runs against the conventional view on Henry VIII clauses, at least as expressed by the Supreme Court of Canada. The article builds on C\u00f4t\u00e9 J.\u2019s dissent in References re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act by providing the philosophic and historical context needed to ground the interpretation of the constitutional text which she advanced in her reasons. A consideration of the text of the Constitution Act, 1867 in its proper philosophic and historical contexts reveals that the purpose of the Constitution, including sections 91 and 92, is the protection of individual liberty through a scheme of mixed government and a balanced separation of powers. This interpretation leads to the conclusion that the Constitution permits delegations of subordinate law-making authority, but does not permit a delegation of primary law-making authority in the form of a Henry VIII clause.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":10,"featured_media":0,"template":"","library--year":[108],"law-and-freedom":[],"library-theme":[168],"dicey-law-review":[78],"main-categories":[67],"class_list":["post-31248","library","type-library","status-publish","hentry","library--year-108","library-theme-constitution-act-1867","dicey-law-review-volume-2","main-categories-dicey-law-review"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/runnymedesociety.ca\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/library\/31248","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/runnymedesociety.ca\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/library"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/runnymedesociety.ca\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/library"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/runnymedesociety.ca\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/10"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/runnymedesociety.ca\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/library\/31248\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/runnymedesociety.ca\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=31248"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"library--year","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/runnymedesociety.ca\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/library--year?post=31248"},{"taxonomy":"law-and-freedom","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/runnymedesociety.ca\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/law-and-freedom?post=31248"},{"taxonomy":"library-theme","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/runnymedesociety.ca\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/library-theme?post=31248"},{"taxonomy":"dicey-law-review","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/runnymedesociety.ca\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/dicey-law-review?post=31248"},{"taxonomy":"main-categories","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/runnymedesociety.ca\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/main-categories?post=31248"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}